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NODE: SDS-PUBLIC-0x01BUILD: b1dfcfd0
TaxonomySDS.WEB.AP
Cover of Murphy’s Guide to Enterprise Agentic Architecture: a fist holding a clear bag of water patched all over with duct tape, still dripping.
Field guide22 entries

Murphy’s Guide to Enterprise Agentic Architecture

Removing paths to failure.

A practical field guide to the architectural seams where enterprise agents fail — and the control-plane requirements exposed when those failures are designed against.

Grouped by what the fix demands, not by subject.

Learning path

Four kinds of repair

Start with a local measure. End with the cases no local fix can reach. The numbered trail is the study order, not the public identifier.

Instrument what already exists

Measure the control, its inputs, and its drift.

  1. 01The gate that only logs

    A required checkpoint exists, fires on every relevant action, and produces an artifact.

  2. 02Trust earned by interaction history

    A counterparty is trusted because of accumulated history: months of correspondence, reliable prior dealings, responsiveness, detailed personal knowledge.

  3. 03Evidence you were shown, not sampled

    "Legal already signed off." "Everyone on the team is doing it this way." An approach that arrives exactly when it is needed, from someone who turns out to share your background, with a track record you can personally verify.

  4. 04Precedent as permission

    "We've done this before" is a sufficient argument. Overrides exist for emergencies and are used weekly.

  5. 05Provenance gaps treated as omissions

    An artifact's origin is partially unknown and that is tolerated as untidy record-keeping.

  6. 06Decisions that cannot be replayed

    Logs record what was decided, not what the decision saw: no inputs, no retrieved context, no model state, no versions.

  7. 07Authority without an expiry

    Approvals, consents, attestations, and risk assessments are granted once and remain in force.

Add a predicate at an existing checkpoint

State the pass condition and test it before action.

  1. 08Approval without deliberation

    "Approve" is whatever the approval surface accepts. Two hundred changes in one dialog.

  2. 09Definitions with no test set

    Terms that gate behavior — "high-risk," "routine," "sensitive," "approved-pattern" — are defined in prose and interpreted at runtime.

  3. 10Memory with no admission test

    Things a system learned in a session become things it knows.

  4. 11The proxy replaced the objective

    Performance is defined by a metric, satisfaction, or approval.

  5. 12Evidence typed but never weighed

    Requirements specify what kind of evidence is needed, not how strong it must be.

  6. 13The rules about the rules are unversioned

    Policies are version-controlled. The definition of what counts as a policy is not.

Change a boundary or contract

Move the boundary or split the contract.

  1. 14Identity inherited from the channel

    The action is attributed to whoever owns the session, the token, or the email thread.

  2. 15Authority boundaries that live only in prose

    Who may act on what is described in policy documents and org charts.

  3. 16Delegation that does not narrow

    Authority is passed along a chain — user to agent, agent to sub-agent, service to service — and each hop re-asserts a claim rather than carrying the original grant.

  4. 17One channel for data and control

    Retrieved documents, tool results, user content, and system instructions all arrive as text in the same context, distinguished by position and convention rather than by an unforgeable tag.

  5. 18No line between proposing and doing

    Proposals, hypotheticals, drafts, and simulations are represented the same way as decisions and actions.

Compositional — resists local repair

Review the whole path and assign its outcome.

  1. 19Every step authorized, no path reviewed

    An agent runs a long loop, decomposing an instruction into sub-goals and acting on each.

  2. 20Nobody owns the composite outcome

    Several components or agents each do their part correctly and a bad outcome emerges from the combination.

  3. 21Independent checks that are not independent

    A second opinion is required and obtained. The reviewers share training, priors, source material, or model lineage.

  4. 22CapstoneControls that only tighten

    Every incident adds a control. No process removes one.

Reference

Field entries

Recognition cues and remedies, grouped by the change each repair needs.

Instrument what already exists

The control is present and the record is being kept. What is missing is a measurement that would show it has stopped working.

  • AP-01The gate that only logs
    You’d see
    A required checkpoint exists, fires on every relevant action, and produces an artifact.
    You’ll fix
    Anchor each checkpoint to its specification and measure its blocking rate, not its completion rate.
  • AP-04Trust earned by interaction history
    You’d see
    A counterparty is trusted because of accumulated history: months of correspondence, reliable prior dealings, responsiveness, detailed personal knowledge.
    You’ll fix
    Record how each significant trust relationship was established.
  • AP-05Evidence you were shown, not sampled
    You’d see
    "Legal already signed off." "Everyone on the team is doing it this way." An approach that arrives exactly when it is needed, from someone who turns out to share your background, with a track record you can personally verify.
    You’ll fix
    Require cited consensus to trace to primary sources; treat unverifiable approval citations as unconfirmed.
  • AP-09Precedent as permission
    You’d see
    "We've done this before" is a sufficient argument. Overrides exist for emergencies and are used weekly.
    You’ll fix
    Anchor normative boundaries to canonical text and treat precedent citation as a reason for more scrutiny, not less.
  • AP-15Provenance gaps treated as omissions
    You’d see
    An artifact's origin is partially unknown and that is tolerated as untidy record-keeping.
    You’ll fix
    Require end-to-end provenance chains on high-consequence artifacts and treat unclaimable gaps as defects.
  • AP-16Decisions that cannot be replayed
    You’d see
    Logs record what was decided, not what the decision saw: no inputs, no retrieved context, no model state, no versions.
    You’ll fix
    Make replay-readiness a service objective for high-consequence actions, logging inputs, context, retrieved evidence, and model state.
  • AP-17Authority without an expiry
    You’d see
    Approvals, consents, attestations, and risk assessments are granted once and remain in force.
    You’ll fix
    Require effective-date attestation on authority-bearing artifacts and verify freshness against authoritative publication at decision time.

Add a predicate at an existing checkpoint

There is a decision point, and it accepts whatever arrives. The fix is a machine-checkable condition it must satisfy first.

  • AP-02Approval without deliberation
    You’d see
    "Approve" is whatever the approval surface accepts. Two hundred changes in one dialog.
    You’ll fix
    Put validity predicates on approval events: human identity, context actually presented, decision freshness, ordering before the action, and a minimum review interval for high-consequence items.
  • AP-06Definitions with no test set
    You’d see
    Terms that gate behavior — "high-risk," "routine," "sensitive," "approved-pattern" — are defined in prose and interpreted at runtime.
    You’ll fix
    Keep frozen edge-case sets for every high-criticality predicate and replay them on a schedule and after any change to surrounding guidance.
  • AP-11Memory with no admission test
    You’d see
    Things a system learned in a session become things it knows.
    You’ll fix
    Make promotion criteria machine-checkable predicates and reject promotions that fail them.
  • AP-12The proxy replaced the objective
    You’d see
    Performance is defined by a metric, satisfaction, or approval.
    You’ll fix
    Codify the full constraint set as separate checkable predicates per authorized objective, and verify actions against all of them rather than the headline measure.
  • AP-14Evidence typed but never weighed
    You’d see
    Requirements specify what kind of evidence is needed, not how strong it must be.
    You’ll fix
    Codify required evidence type and minimum strength per claim class, and reject below-threshold claims rather than accepting them with a note.
  • AP-19The rules about the rules are unversioned
    You’d see
    Policies are version-controlled. The definition of what counts as a policy is not.
    You’ll fix
    Version-control meta-predicates separately from the artifacts they classify, require elevated governance for changes to them, and replay current artifact-class membership against the prior predicate after any change.

Change a boundary or contract

The failure is in where a line was drawn, or in two things sharing one channel that should not. Moving it is an architectural change.

  • AP-03Identity inherited from the channel
    You’d see
    The action is attributed to whoever owns the session, the token, or the email thread.
    You’ll fix
    Bind identity per action, not per session, with an attestation the channel cannot forge.
  • AP-07Authority boundaries that live only in prose
    You’d see
    Who may act on what is described in policy documents and org charts.
    You’ll fix
    Maintain the authority graph with explicit jurisdictional edges.
  • AP-08Delegation that does not narrow
    You’d see
    Authority is passed along a chain — user to agent, agent to sub-agent, service to service — and each hop re-asserts a claim rather than carrying the original grant.
    You’ll fix
    Make delegation scope-narrowing-only, each hop a strict subset.
  • AP-10One channel for data and control
    You’d see
    Retrieved documents, tool results, user content, and system instructions all arrive as text in the same context, distinguished by position and convention rather than by an unforgeable tag.
    You’ll fix
    Tag every context token with source and trust attestation, gate instruction-following on that tag, and sandbox retrieved content away from the instruction channel.
  • AP-18No line between proposing and doing
    You’d see
    Proposals, hypotheticals, drafts, and simulations are represented the same way as decisions and actions.
    You’ll fix
    Require modal-state tagging on artifacts crossing the planner/executor boundary and gate tool execution on the declared state.

Compositional — resists local repair

Every element passes review on its own terms and the arrangement still fails. No local repair reaches these; the composition is the defect.

  • AP-13Every step authorized, no path reviewed
    You’d see
    An agent runs a long loop, decomposing an instruction into sub-goals and acting on each.
    You’ll fix
    Mandate periodic global-state checks inside long loops and express founding constraints as trajectory-level predicates, not step-level ones.
  • AP-21Nobody owns the composite outcome
    You’d see
    Several components or agents each do their part correctly and a bad outcome emerges from the combination.
    You’ll fix
    Make implicit shared-frame assumptions explicit cross-component contracts and verify them at runtime.
  • AP-22Independent checks that are not independent
    You’d see
    A second opinion is required and obtained. The reviewers share training, priors, source material, or model lineage.
    You’ll fix
    Require periodic independent re-interpretation of consequential artifacts by reviewers with no access to prior labels, and treat low variance as a monoculture signal rather than a quality signal.
  • AP-20Controls that only tighten
    You’d see
    Every incident adds a control. No process removes one.
    You’ll fix
    Sunset incident-time hardening by default and require a positive decision to make it permanent.